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This paper presents the results of a ten-country comparative study of health care financing 
systems and their progressivity characteristics. It distinguishes between the tax-financed systems 
of Denmark, Portugal and the U.K., the social insurance systems of France, the Netherlands 
and Spain, and the predominantly private systems of Switzerland and the U.S. It concludes that 
tax-financed systems tend to be proportional or mildly progressive, that social insurance systems 
are regressive and that private systems are even more regressive. Out-of-pocket payments are in 
most countries an especially regressive means of raising health care revenues. 
1. Introduction 
Health care reform looks set to stay high on the policy-making agenda in 
the 1990s. Some of the reforms that were planned during the 1980s have 
already begun to be implemented. These include the so-called internal market 
programme in Britain, the move from fee-for-service to capitation payments 
for low-income patients of GPs in Ireland and the switch from social 
insurance to tax-financing in Spain. Other reforms are likely to follow 
elsewhere. Some variant on the 1988 Dekker Plan aimed at promoting 
competition amongst insurers and providers is likely to be implemented in 
the Netherlands in the early 1990s. The Swiss are shortly to vote in a 
referendum proposing a large increase in the role of taxation in the financing 
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of health care. And reforms to the American health care system look 
increasingly likely, as health care costs and the number of uninsured 
continue to rise remorselessly. 
Despite the widespread interest in health care reform, the debate so far has 
been somewhat parochial in character. Although Peet’s (1991) claim that 
‘most countries are dealing with health care reform as if each was on Mars’ 
is somewhat overstated, it is undoubtedly true that more can be learnt from 
cross-country comparisons than has been learnt up until now about the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with alternative methods of iinanc- 
ing and delivering health care, and about the likely effects of health care 
reforms. Moreover, the few cross-country comparisons that have been 
undertaken to date have focussed mostly on expenditure comparisons, 
although some have tried to go further and address broader efficiency 
issues.’ The result is that remarkably little is known about the equity 
characteristics of alternative health care financing and delivery systems, and 
about the likely equity implications of reforms to these systems. This is 
despite the apparent importance attached to equity as a policy objective in 
most OECD countries. Indeed, some [McLachlan and Maynard (1982); 
Mooney (1986)] go so far as to claim that the public attaches greater 
importance to equity than to efficiency in health care. 
This paper and an accompanying paper report the results of a comparative 
project which seeks to go some way towards filling this gap in the literature.2 
Its aim was to generate evidence on the comparative perfor- 
mance - in terms of equity ~ of different health care financing and delivery 
systems. The 10 countries which participated in the study ~ Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the 
U.K. and the U.S. - encompass the full spectrum of health care financing 
and delivery systems, ranging from the predominantly private U.S. system, 
through the mixed public-private social insurance systems of countries like 
France and the Netherlands, to the almost 100% public systems operating in 
Denmark and the U.K. 
Besides its focus on equity, three other features of the project distinguish it 
from previous cross-country comparisons. One is that, in contrast to 
previous empirical studies of a comparative nature, which have almost all 
been based on aggregate data, the present study employs micro-level data. 
This is in line with the recommendation of Schieber and Poullier (1991), 
who, in their latest OECD comparative study, urged that greater use be 
made of micro-level data in cross-country comparisons in the health care 
field. A second feature of the present study is that those participating have 
‘For a recent study of health care expenditures see Gerdtham et al. (1992). For an attempt to 
move beyond expenditure comparisons to broader effkiency issues, see Culyer et al. (1981). 
*The project was coordinated jointly by Frans Rutten, Eddy van Doorslaer and Adam 
Wagstaff. 
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together developed and then applied a common methodology. There is, as a 
result, a high degree of comparability in the empirical results. Differences in 
results ought therefore to reflect genuine differences between countries rather 
than differences in methods. A third feature of the project is that the analysis 
for each of the 10 countries has been undertaken, for the most part, by 
research teams from the country in question. This contrasts with previous 
comparative studies in the health field where one or two researchers have 
invariably performed the analysis for all the countries in the study. 
That equity is a goal that is pursued by policy-makers in all types of 
health care system is readily apparent. But what is equity? How should it be 
defined? And how is it to be measured? Answers to these questions are far 
from self-evident but are clearly required if meaningful cross-country compar- 
isons are to be performed. It is sometimes suggested that academics and 
policy-makers agree much less over what they mean by equity than they do 
over what they mean by efficiency. McLachlan and Maynard (1982), for 
example, have suggested that ‘. . . equity, like beauty, is in the mind of the 
beholder.. .’ (p. 520). As Le Grand (1987) notes, this view is not entirely 
justified. Examination of the relevant philosophy literature, as well as policy 
documents and empirical work in this field reveals, in fact, a reasonable 
degree of consensus. 
Of the various theories of distributive justice that might be brought to 
bear on the issue of equity in healthy care, it is generally agreed that some 
have a greater applicability and acceptability than others. Gillon (1986), for 
example, argues that of the various distributive principles proposed by 
philosophers in this context, it is the egalitarian notion that health care 
ought to be distributed according to need which commands the greatest 
support among health professions and the public at large. This principle is 
often coupled, of course, with the principle of ‘from each according to his 
ability to pay’. 
A comparison of policy statements on equity in several OECD countries 
suggests that policy-makers are in broad agreement over what they mean by 
equity, even if the precise details vary. There appears to be broad agreement, 
for example, among policy-makers in at least eight of the nine European 
countries in the present study that payments towards health care should be 
related to ability to pay rather than to use of medical facilities.3 Policy- 
makers in all nine European countries also appear to be committed to the 
notion that all citizens should have access to health care.4 In many 
countries this is taken further, it being made clear that access to and receipt 
of health care should depend on need, rather than on ability to pay. 
Finally, in empirical work, researchers from countries with such different 
3Hurst (1992) concludes the same in his comparison of the health care sytems of Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and U.K. 
4Again, the same conclusion has been reached by Hurst (1992) in his comparative study. 
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health care systems as Britain and the United States have adopted much the 
same notions of equity in their analysis. Most studies of equity in the 
delivery of health care - in both Europe and the U.S. - start from the 
premise that health care ought to be distributed according to need, rather 
than willingness and ability to pay, and all empirical studies to date of equity 
in the finance of health care take as their starting point the premise that 
health care ought to be financed according to ability to pay.5 
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, then, there seems to be a broad 
measure of support for the notion that health care ought to be financed 
according to ability to pay and distributed according to need. It is this 
ethical premise that provides the point of departure of the present study. The 
remainder of this paper examines the issue of equity in the finance of health 
care focussing on progressivity, i.e. the extent to which families on higher 
incomes pay larger shares of their incomes towards health care. A com- 
panion paper [Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. (1992)] examines the issue of 
equity in the delivery of health care, focussing on the horizontal equity 
aspect of health care provision, i.e. the extent to which persons in equal need 
are treated the same irrespective of their income. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
principal differences across the 10 countries in their health care linancing 
systems. Section 3 considers the problems associated with defining and 
measuring equity in the finance of health care, and seeks to justify the 
present project’s focus on the issue of progressivity. Section 4 outlines the 
incidence assumptions employed, the data sources and the variable detini- 
tions. The next section - section 5 - presents the empirical results. The final 
section contains a summary and draws various conclusions. 
2. Cross-country differences in health care financing systems 
Countries typically finance the bulk of their health care expenditures from 
two or more of four sources: (i) general taxation, (ii) social insurance 
contributions, (iii) private insurance premiums, and (iv) out-of-pocket pay- 
ments. There is, however, substantial variation across countries in both the 
way revenue is raised within each source and the relative importance of each 
source. As will be seen, both are important determinants of the overall 
progressivity of any health care financing system. 
2. I. Roles of’,fi:nancing sources 
Table 1 shows how revenue is raised from each source in each of the 10 
countries in the present study. The year indicated is the year to which the 
‘See Hurst (1985), who compares the American, British and Canadian financing systems, and 
Gottschalk, Haveman and Wolfe (1989), who compare the American, British and Dutch systems. 
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data used in the empirical analysis for the country in question refer. Only in 
two cases - Spain and Portugal - has there been a major change in the 
health care financing system since the year indicated in table 1. 
A variety of taxes are used to finance health care. Rarely are they 
earmarked. Usually, they are simply general tax revenues and include 
therefore both direct taxes (such as income tax) and indirect taxes (such as 
VAT). By contrast, social insurance revenues frequently are earmarked. This 
is true of countries like the Netherlands were social insurance takes the form 
of contributions to a sickness fund, but also of countries like Italy and the 
U.S. where social insurance takes the form of a payroll tax collected by the 
State. Whatever the precise system, contributions are compulsory for almost 
all the population (opting out, if allowed, tends to be restricted to persons 
with high earnings) and linked to earnings (contributions are frequently split 
between employee and employer, and are often proportional to earnings up 
to a ceiling). The role of private insurance also varies across countries. In 
some countries (e.g. the Netherlands and the U.S.) private insurance provides 
cover for persons without comprehensive public cover. In others (e.g. Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the U.K.) private insurance provides supplementary (i.e. 
double) cover to persons who already have comprehensive public cover. In 
other countries still (e.g. Denmark and France) private insurance provides 
cover against public sector co-payments levied on prescription medicines, 
dental care, etc. In one country - Ireland - private insurance serves all three 
functions. Finally, the role of out-of-pocket payments varies somewhat across 
countries. In some (e.g. Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, the U.K. 
and the US.) they are predominantly co-payments, with a third party 
picking up (usually) the major share of the bill. In others (e.g. Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) there is extensive use of the private sector on a fee-paying basis. 
2.2. The financing mix 
The importance attached to each source of finance varies substantially 
across countries, as is apparent from fig. 1. Here ‘general taxes’ exclude any 
payroll taxes used to finance health care; these are included under ‘social 
insurance’. 
One important distinction is between financing systems that are predomi- 
nantly public and those that are predominantly private. The U.S. and 
Switzerland stand out in fig. 1 as the only countries relying on out-of-pocket 
payments and private insurance premiums for the majority of their 
revenues.6 In the European countries other than Switzerland the picture is 
‘%witzerland is usually shown as being predominantly public [Maxwell (1981); OECD (1989)]. 
This is because the premiums paid to sickness funds for basic health insurance cover are 
recorded under social insurance in the Swiss national accounts. This practice is misleading, since 
these premiums are neither compulsory nor earnings-related. 
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Fig. 1. Health care financing sources. Years indicated in table 3. 
markedly different: private expenditures typically account for around one 
quarter of health care expenditures. There is, however, some variation: in the 
U.K. only 13.5% of expenditures are private of which 64% are out-of-pocket, 
whilst in Portugal in 1981 almost 30% was financed privately and virtually 
all was out-of-pocket. Moreover, this figure had grown to almost 40% in 
1987, making Portugal the country with the highest share of health care paid 
for out-of-pocket. 
Fig. 1 also reveals that in most countries (Switzerland and the Netherlands 
are exceptions) out-of-pocket payments account for the majority of private 
expenditures. Again, however, there is substantial variation: in Denmark and 
the three southern European countries almost all private expenditures are 
out-of-pocket, whilst in the U.S. private expenditures are almost equally 
divided between private insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments. 
Another important distinction is between social insurance-based public 
systems and tax-based public systems. In the year indicated in table 1, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain all financed the bulk of their public 
expenditures out of earmarked social insurance contributions. At the other 
extreme are Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland and the U.K., where 
the majority of public expenditures are financed out of general taxation. 
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Fig. 2. Health care financing triangle. 
IO 
Public health care expenditures in Italy and the U.S. are financed more or 
less equally from social insurance and general tax revenues. 
The overall differences between countries in health care financing can be 
shown more clearly in the ‘health care financing triangle’ in fig. 2. The closer 
a country is to the bottom left-hand corner, the closer it is to being 100% 
private. Amongst the 10 countries in the study, Switerland and the U.S. are 
the most private. By contrast the closer a country is to the hypotenuse, the 
closer it is to being 100% public. Of the countries in the present study, 
Denmark and the U.K. have the most public financing systems. Amongst the 
predominantly public systems one can distinguish between those that are 
predominantly tax-financed and those that are predominantly social 
insurance-financed. The former, which lie at the top left-hand corner, include 
Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and the U.K. The latter, which lie at the bottom 
right-hand corner, include France, the Netherlands and Spain (as of 1980). 
Only Italy fails to fall into one of the three groups, despite the stated intent 
of the Italian government to move firmly towards a tax-financed public 
health care system. 
During the 1980s only two of the 10 countries have significantly changed 
their location in the health care financing triangle: Spain and Portugal. As 
Rodriguez et al. (1993) point out, the share of taxes grew rapidly in Spain 
during the 1980s as an act of policy, and is now larger than the social 
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insurance share. Spain has thus moved towards the top left corner in fig. 2. 
Portugal, by contrast, has seen a rapid rise in the share of health care 
expenditures financed privately during the 1980s with the result that 
Portugal is now roughly midway between the tax-financed bloc of countries 
in the top left-hand corner and the predominantly privately-financed bloc of 
countries towards the bottom left-hand corner. 
3. Measuring equity in the finance of health care 
The requirement that health care be tinanced according to ability to pay 
can be interpreted in terms of both vertical equity (in this case the 
requirement that persons or families of unequal ability to pay make 
appropriately dissimilar payments for health care) and horizontal equity (the 
requirement that persons or families of the same ability to pay make the 
same contribution). The present paper focuses on the former. 
In addressing the issue of vertical equity, consideration has to be given to 
the precise form that the differential treatment of unequals should take. 
Should those with greater ability to pay be paying more in proportional 
terms? In other words ought the relationship between ability to pay and 
payments to be progressive?’ Or should they merely be paying more in 
absolute terms? In other words can the relationship between ability to pay 
and payments be proportional or even regressive?8 If the relationship is to 
be progressive, how progressive ought it to be? Typically policy statements 
fail to address questions such as these. In the absence of a clear statement 
from policy-makers on just how much more the better-off should pay 
towards health care than the poor, the present study focuses simply on the 
degree of progressivity. Do the better-off pay a larger proportion of their 
income on health care than the poor? How progressive or regressive is the 
relationship between income and payments towards health care? Are some 
ways of raising revenues more progressive than others? How are these 
differences reflected in the progressivity characteristics of individual countries’ 
financing systems? 
Previous work on progressivity in the finance of health care has been 
based on tabulations of health care payments by income group [cf. e.g. Hurst 
(1985); Gottschalk et al. (1989)]. Such tabulations do not, however, enable 
one to answer the question of how much more (or less) progressive one 
system (or source of finance) is than another. At best they can indicate 
whether a system is progressive. regressive or proportional. A more illumi- 
‘A finance system is progressive if the proportion of income paid out for health care rises as 
the level of income rises. 
*A finance system is proportional if the proportion of income paid out for health care is the 
same at all income levels and regressive if the proportion of income paid out falls as income 
rises. 
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Fig. 3. Kakwani and Suits indices of progressivity 
nating approach to assessing the progressivity of health care financing 
systems is to employ progressiuity indices [cf. Wagstaff et al. (1989)]. A 
variety of such indices have been proposed in the literature on tax 
progressivity [Lambert (1989)]. Two such indices - namely those of Kakwani 
(1977) and Suits (1977) - have been employed in the present study 
comparisons to be performed both across countries and across 
sources. We outline each index in turn and then compare them. 
to enable 
financing 
3.1. K akwani’s index of progressiuity 
Kakwani’s index is based on the extent to which a tax system departs from 
proportionality and can best be illustrated using fig. 3~. The curve labelled 
g,,,(p) is the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income. The second curve ~ labelled 
g,,,(p) - is the tux concentration curve, which plots the cumulative propor- 
tions of the population (ranked according to pre-tax income as with g,,,(p)) 
against the cumulative proportion of tax payments. If taxes are levied strictly 
in proportion to income, the tax concentration curve and the Lorenz curve 
for pre-tax income coincide. If the average tax rate rises with income (so that 
the tax system is progressive), the tax concentration curve lies outside the 
Lorenz curve for pre-tax income. The opposite is true if taxes are regressive. 
The degree of progressivity can therefore be assessed by looking at the size of 
the area between g,,,(p) and g,,,(p). If Gpre is the Gini coefficient for pre-tax 
income, and C,,, is the concentration index for tax payments, Kakwani’s 
index of progressivity, rr,, is defined as 
71~ = Cm - Gpre, (1) 
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which is twice the area between g,,,(p) and g,,,(p). If the system is 
progressive, as in fig 3a, 7ck is positive. If, by contrast, the system is 
regressive, so that g,,,(p) lies above g&p), rck is negative. The value of nnK 
ranges from - 2.0 (when all pre-tax income is concentrated in the hands of 
the richest person and the entire tax burden falls on someone else) to 1.0 
(when pre-tax income is distributed equally and the entire tax burden falls on 
one person). 
3.2. Suits’ index of progressivity 
Kakwani’s index of tax progressivity is based on standard Lorenz and 
concentration curves. Suits’ index, by contrast, is based on what Lambert 
and Pfahler (1988) call relative concentration curves. The index is illustrated 
in fig. 3b. The curve labelled k,,,(y) is the relative concentration curve for 
pre-tax income. This plots the cumulative proportion of pre-tax income 
(starting at the bottom of the distribution) against the cumulative proportion 
of pre-tax income rather than against the cumulative proportion of the 
population (as is the case with Kakwani’s approach). Thus k,,,(y) coincides 
with the 45” line and serves as the benchmark against which to assess 
progressivity. The curve labelled k,,,(y) plots the cumulative proportion of 
pre-tax income (starting, as before, at the bottom of the distribution) against 
the cumulative proportion of tax payments borne by the households in the 
relevant part of the income distribution. If taxes are levied in proportion to 
income, k,,,(y) and k,,,(y) coincide, so that, for example, the bottom 10% of 
pre-tax income goes to finance 10% of tax payments. If the tax system is 
progressive, k,,,(y) lies below the diagonal (the case illustrated). The opposite 
is true if taxes are regressive. The degree of progressivity can therefore be 
assessed by looking at the size of the area between k,,,(y) and k,,,(y). If H,,, 
is the relative concentration index for tax payments, Suits’ index of progressi- 
vity, xs, is defined as 
71s = Htaxr (2) 
which is twice the area between k,,,(y) and k,,,(y). If the tax system is 
progressive, as in fig. 3b, rrs is positive. If, by contrast, the system is 
regressive, so that k,,,(y) lies above k&y), n, is negative. The value of n, 
ranges from - 1.0 (when the entire tax burden falls on the poorest person) to 
1.0 (when the entire tax burden falls on the richest person). 
3.3. Properties of the Kukwani und Suits indices 
Formby et al. (1981) have shown that the Suits index gives greater weight 
to departures from proportionality that occur amongst higher income groups 
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than to departures from proportionality occurring amongst lower income 
groups. This is shown graphically by the lines joining figs. 3a and 3b. Thus, 
for example, the departure from proportionality amongst the bottom 30% of 
the population gets a smaller weight in the Suits index than in the Kakwani 
index: the area between the concentration curve and the benchmark curve is 
much smaller for the bottom 30”/, in the case of the Suits index than in the 
case of the Kakwani index.’ 
A useful property of both the Kakwani and Suits indices is that the overall 
index for a tax system consisting of two or more taxes is a weighted average 
of the indices for the individual taxes, where the weights are the proportions 
of each tax in total tax revenue [Suits (1977)]. Thus the progressivity 
characteristics of a health care financing system depend on the proportion of 
total revenues raised from each source and the degree of progressivity of 
each of these sources. 
Another feature of these progressivity indices is worth mentioning. It is 
prefectly possible for a source of finance (or a tax) to be progressive (or 
regressive) at low income levels but regressive (or progressive) at high income 
levels. Suppose, for example, that pensioners are exempt from social insur- 
ance contributions and tend to be located in the lower income groups. 
Suppose too that contributions are proportional (assume for simplicity to 
income) but only up to a ceiling. The exemption of pensioners makes the 
system progressive at low income levels (the bottom income groups will tend 
to pay a relatively small fraction of their income towards health care) but 
regressive at high income levels (as a person’s income rises above the ceiling, 
the proportion of their income they pay towards health will fall). The result 
is that the payment concentration curve will cross from below the relevant 
benchmark curve (the Lorenz curve in the case of the standard concentration 
curve and the 45” line in the case of the relative concentration curve). This is 
shown in fig. 4 in the case of the standard concentration curve. Calculating 
the Kakwani index as the differences between C,,, and Gpre in the case 
illustrated in fig. 4 implies that the regressivity at high income offsets - at 
least partially - the progressivity at low incomes. The result could, of course, 
be a zero value for the progressivity index. Similar remarks apply to the 
Suits index. In view of the relationship between the two indices shown in figs 
3a and 3b, it ought to be apparent that where the concentration curves cross 
their benchmark curves, it is possible for the Kakwani and Suits indices to 
have opposite signs. 
4. Data, variable definitions and incidence assumptions 
It is clear that in a comparative study of this type, harmonization of 
‘We are indebted to the late Peter Ellemann-Jensen for this diagrammatic demonstration of 
the differences between the two indices. 
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Fig. 4. Intersection of Lorenz and tax concentration curves 
variable definitions is vital. This section describes the data sources, the 
variable definitions used, and the incidence assumptions employed. 
4. I. Assigning the ,f‘inancing burden 
As is evident from table 1, very few taxes are earmarked for health care. 
Moreover, in many countries some genera/ social insurance contributions are 
used to finance health care. Some method is therefore required for deciding 
which non-earmarked payments actually go towards the financing of health 
care. In the empirical work reported in this paper, taxes and social insurance 
contributions that are not earmarked have been allocated pro rata according 
to the shares of the relevant revenues going to finance health care. This 
procedure, which is evidently somewhat arbitrary, is equivalent to weighting 
the progressivity index of each tax or social insurance scheme by its share in 
total health care expenditures. 
Irrespective of whether or not a particular source of health care financing 
is earmarked, the question arises as to who bears the burden of the payment. 
Who, for example, bears the burden of - as distinct from ‘who is liable to 
pay?’ - contributions paid by employers towards social or private health 
insurance schemes? In principle one would like to bring empirical evidence to 
bear on this issue, since it is well known that the incidence of a tax depends 
on the relevant elasticities. For example, the portion of the employer social 
insurance contribution that is borne by the employee will depend on the 
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elasticity of the labour supply curve [Atkinson and Stiglitz (1987)]. In 
practice, the evidence on incidence is far from clear-cut and one is forced to 
opt for the less ambitious option of making a set of necessarily arbitrary 
incidence assumptions. In principle, one could adopt different sets of 
incidence assumptions for different countries, but this was rejected in the 
present study on the ground that one could not then be sure whether 
differences in progressivity were due to differences in financing systems or to 
differences in, say, labour market conditions. Where possible personal income 
tax and property taxes were assumed to be borne by the tax-payers 
concerned, corporate income taxes by shareholders, sales and excise taxes by 
consumers, and employee and employer social insurance contributions by 
employees. 
4.2. Data and variable dejnitions 
Typically - though not always ~ the rules governing health care payments 
(especially taxes and health insurance premiums) apply to families or 
households rather than individuals. Thus measuring the progressivity of 
health care financing systems requires household-level” data on pre-tax 
income and health care payments, with the latter broken down into (i) 
taxation, (ii) social insurance contributions, (iii) private insurance premiums, 
and (iv) out-of-pocket payments. The surveys used to analyse progressivity in 
the finance of health care in the 10 countries in the present study are listed in 
table 2. 
Gross (i.e. pre-tax) income was employed as the benchmark against which 
to assess progressivity: gross income includes wage income as well as non- 
wage income (e.g. cash transfers, cash property income, etc.). Not all surveys 
contain information on pre-tax income, in which case countries have had to 
estimate it from data on post-tax income. In all but the American and British 
results the gross income figure was converted to a per-equivalent-adult basis 
in order to take into account the variation in household structure that exists 
across families, with countries using whichever equivalence scale they felt to 
be appropriate.’ ’ 
None of the surveys listed in table 2 is sufficiently comprehensive to allow 
the entire financing burden to be allocated across income groups using only 
‘“Rules relating to the finance of health care. especially those concerning private health 
insurance, often apply to the family rather than the household. The latter, however, is typically 
the income-sharing unit and hence is arguably the more appropriate for assessing how health 
care payments relate to ability to pay. 
“The argument for employing different equivalence scales is that the circumstances of 
countries differ. The argument against this strategy is that use of different sales ‘would be to 
invite the response that any inter-country differences emerging in the consequent results simply 
reflected these equivalence scale differences.’ [O’Higgins, Schmaus and Stephenson (1990; 25)]. 
Health care payments were not equivahzed in the calculation of the concentration indices. 
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country Abbr. Year 
Denmark DK 1981 
France F 1984 
Ireland IRL 1987 
Italy I I987 
Netherlands NL 1987 
Portugal P 1981 
Spain E 1980 
Switzerland CH 1982 
U.K. U.K. 1985 
U.S. U.S. 1980 
information recorded in the survey. Some surveys, for example, do not 
Table 2 
Surveys used in progressivity analysis. 
Institution No. of 
Survey(s) conducting survey households 
Household Expenditure Danmarks Statistik 2,783 
Survey 
Family Expenditure Survey INSEE 11,977 
Household Budget Survey cso 7,705 
Family Consumption Survey ISTAT 3,164 
Household Expenditure CBS 2,750 
Survey 
Family Income and INE 8,054 
Expenditure Survey 
Family Budget Survey INE 23,972 
SOMIPOPS and SEVS National Science 3,835 
surveys Foundation 
Family Expenditure Survey cso 7,000 
NMCUES National Center for 6,000 
Health Statistics 
contain information on property taxes. Authors have had therefore to 
explore alternative data sources for at least some sources of finance, or else 
make informed guesses as to the distribution of the omitted categories. 
Fig. 5 shows the proportion of revenues allocated from each of five data 
sources. The first source is the ruw data of the principal survey used in the 
analysis - the survey listed in table 2. This source is the most flexible. The 
second category is published tabulated data that have been derived from the 
principal survey by other researchers. The U.K. results, for example, have 
been derived using tables published by the Central Statistical Office based on 
data from the British Family Expenditure Survey. The disadvantage of pre- 
tabulated data is obvious: researchers have no option but to live with the 
definitions adopted by the persons who have done the tabulations. House- 
holds may, for example, have been ranked by income or equivalent 
expenditure, instead of equivalent income. The third category is data from 
other surveys. Sometimes the survey is in the same series but another year: 
the Irish and U.K. results, for example, are based in part on data from 
previous years of the primary survey. Alternatively the survey can be another 
survey entirely: the Dutch results, for example, are based in part on 
tabulations of indirect taxes from a survey other than the principal survey. 
The fourth category comprises estimated distributions. This is where 
researchers did not have access to data on the variable in question but have 
been able to estimate its distribution across income groups by using 
information from other studies. The distribution of semi-private insurance 
premiums in the Swiss results, for example, have been estimated by drawing 
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30 
‘20 
10 
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DK F IRL I NL P E CH UK US 
Fig. 5. Breakdown of data sources used. 
on econometric estimates of the income-elasticity of demand for this type of 
insurance. The fifth category comprises ‘guesstimates’. Some of these are more 
informed than others. Omitted indirect taxes, for example, have often been 
assumed to be distributed as the indirect taxes that have been allocated from 
survey data. Occasionally no explicit assumption has been made. If only part 
of a category has been allocated on the basis of survey data, but the 
progressivity index has been weighted by the full share of the financing 
source, the implicit assumption is that the omitted part is distributed as the 
included part. If, by contrast, the source is omitted completely, the implicit 
assumption is that the source is distributed as the overall burden of included 
sources. 
As is apparent from fig. 5, in most cases over 90% of revenues were 
allocated using raw survey data, tabulated data or data from other surveys. 
Exceptions to this are Ireland and Italy, where nearly 900/, has been 
allocated from survey data, and Portugal and Switzerland, where the 
distribution of more than 20% of revenues had to be estimated to ‘guessti- 
mated’. For the most part the gaps are in the distributions of taxes, though 
in Switzerland and the U.K. the distributions of some non-tax revenues had 
to be estimated or ‘guesstimated’. 
tabulated data 
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5. Empirical results 
Table 3 reports the Kakwani and Suits indices for each of the 10 countries’ 
health care financing systems, as well as for their constituent parts.12 
5. I. Taxes 
As noted above, most direct taxes other than personal income tax have 
not been allocated, so most direct tax distributions reflect only this tax. 
Unsurprisingly, direct taxes are progressive in all countries, though the 
degree of progressivity varies. According to table 3, the countries with the 
most progressive direct tax systems are Portugal and Ireland, and the 
country with the least progressive system is Italy. The latter provides a nice 
example of the need to look beyond 1 the rate structure when assessing 
progressivity: in 1987 the Italian personal income tax system contained no 
less than nine bands, but because so few people paid tax at the higher rates, 
the system was relatively unprogressive. 
In most countries indirect taxes are regressive, this being particularly so in 
Ireland and the U.S. The fact that indirect taxes are progressive in Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, is due to higher VAT rates being levied on luxury 
goods. 
The overall progressivity of the tax system can be calculated as a weighted 
average of the Kakwani (or Suits) indices for direct and indirect taxes, where 
the weights correspond to the shares of each tax in total tax revenues. In all 
eight countries general taxes are at least proportional (Denmark) and are 
generally progressive, though ~ unsurprisingly ~ less so than direct taxes.13 
5.2. Social insurance 
In the three countries operating social insurance-based health care tinanc- 
ing systems ~ France, the Netherlands and Spain - social insurance is 
regressive. l4 This stems from the fact that contributions tend to be pro- 
portional to earnings only up to a ceiling. These systems would, however, be 
“The results reported in this section are taken from van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten 
(1993), except in the case of Italy, where the revised results reported in Paci and Wagstaff (1993) 
have been used. 
“See van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten (1993) for further results. 
14The progressivity index in the case of the Netherlands reflects only contributions to the 
AWBZ scheme for coverage against catastrophic expenses. Premiums paid by the bottom and 
middle income groups to sickness funds for non-catastrophic cover have been labelled as 
‘private’, since these were included under the same heading in the Dutch Housel~old Expenditure 
Suroey as the private premiums paid by the top income group for the same cover. Because 
people pay either one premium or the other depending on their earnings, including the sickness 
fund premiums with the AWBZ premiums (which are paid by everyone) rather than private 
premiums would make social insurance more regressive and private insurance more progressive. 
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other insurance 
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cumulative % of income 
Fig. 6. Relative concentration curves for the Netherlands. 
even more regressive if groups such as pensioners were not exempt from 
contributions, as in, for example, the Netherlands and Spain, or did not face 
reduced contribution rates. as they do, for example, in France. In such 
countries, social insurance is actually progressive at low income levels. The 
Dutch case is illustrated in fig. 6. 
In Italy, where health-specific social insurance contributions still play a 
major role in the finance of public health care, social insurance is actually 
mildly progressive. This is despite the fact that the marginal contribution rate 
actually declines with earnings. One reason may be that whilst contributions 
may be regressive on earnings, they may be proportional - or even 
progressive - on income. Another is the fact that different groups are treated 
differently within the Italian social insurance system. Pensioners, for example, 
are exempt from social insurance contributions, as they are in some other 
countries. Another explanation is that professional groups face different 
contribution schedules, with persons who face the lower average contribution 
rates tending to have relatively small declared incomes. 
The progressivity of the Portuguese social insurance scheme stems from 
the fact that although contributions to the scheme are earnings-related and 
compulsory, the scheme is not universal, covering and requiring contribu- 
382 ‘4. WugstajJet al., Equity in the finance of health cure 
tions from only certain employees, the majority of these working in the 
public sector. Its progressivity is due to the fact that these workers tend to be 
in the higher income groups (the top decile alone contributed 427; of the 
scheme’s revenues). 
In both Ireland and the U.K., where there are no earmarked social 
insurance contributions or where earmarking plays only a small role, social 
insurance is progressive, whereas in the U.S., where a percentage of social 
insurance is earmarked for public health care, social insurance is regressive. 
5.3. Private insurance 
In interpreting the results on private health insurance it is important to 
bear in mind the cover that private insurance buys in each country. Broadly- 
speaking, three groupings emerge from table 1, the exception being Ireland, 
which, as indicated above, spans all three groups. 
The first comprises countries where private insurance buys cover against 
public sector co-payments and includes Denmark and France. The fact that 
private insurance against public sector co-payments is progressive in 
Denmark but regressive in France reflects the fact that private insurance 
against public sector co-payments is more widespread in France than in 
Denmark. This in turn reflects the higher co-payments in France. 
The second group comprises countries where private insurance is mostly 
taken out as supplementary cover (mostly ‘double’ cover) to that provided by 
the State and includes Italy, Portugal and the U.K. Private insurance of this 
type is progressive, which suggests that such insurance is a ‘luxury’ good. 
The third group comprises countries where, for the individual concerned, 
private insurance is (or is nearly) the sole source of cover. This group 
includes the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the U.S. Switzerland is 
unusual in this group in that private insurance is bought by almost everyone. 
In the other three countries, private insurance is generally taken out only by 
persons with restricted or non-existent public cover.15 In the U.S. persons 
purchasing private insurance as their sole source of cover make up the bulk 
of the population, whilst in Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain they 
comprise 29:0, 3976 and 1.5% of the population, respectively.lh As is apparent 
from table 3, where it is relied upon by the majority of the population for 
cover, as in Switzerland and the U.S., private insurance is highly regressive. 
The highly negative Dutch index value stems from the fact that the figures 
include not only the genuinely private cover bought by the 3976 of the 
population with private insurance, but also the non-catastophic cover bought 
by the remaining 61% of the population from sickness funds. Had only the 
151n the U.S. a small proportion of expenditures on private insurance is accounted for by 
persons with public cover purchasing supplementary insurance. 
lhFigures refer to 1987. 
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former been included, private insurance would have emerged as being 
progressive, as it is in Ireland where private insurance is taken out mainly by 
the better off..” The fact that private insurance is regressive in Spain in the 
year in question reflects the fact that many of those taking out private 
insurance were the self-employed who neither had public cover nor were 
particularly well-off. 
5.4. Out-of-pocket payments 
Out-of-pocket payments tend to be a highly regressive means of financing 
health care. In all countries in the study except Spain, such payments were 
regressive. There is, however, some variation across countries. That out-of- 
pocket payments were only midly regressive in Ireland and the Netherlands 
in 1987 stems from the fact that the private cover taken out by persons in 
the higher income groups without comprehensive public cover was either not 
comprehensive or required co-payments. In Ireland persons in the top 62”i, 
of the income distribution were required to pay for GP visits and prescrip- 
tion drugs in full, while in the Netherlands much of the expenditures 
associated with out-of-pocket payments were incurred by the privately 
insured in the upper half of the income distribution having insurance policies 
with substantial deductibles or excluding primary care. That out-of-pocket 
payments are so regressive in Switzerland and the U.S. stems from the fact 
that - with the exception of Medicaid enrollees and some privately insured in 
the U.S. ~ co-payments are paid by all irrespective of their income. 
5.5. Overall cross-country dijjhences in progressivity of financing systems 
It is striking that in only three countries ~ the U.K., Ireland and Portugal 
_ is health care finance progressive. Also striking is that the progressivity 
indices for total health care payments fall into the same three clusters that 
emerged in the health care financing triangle in fig. 2. The two countries with 
predominantly private financing systems ~ Switzerland and the U.S. - have 
the most regressive structures overall. This is scarcely surprising in view of 
how regressive private insurance and out-of-pocket payments are when used 
to finance such a large proportion of health care expenditures for such a 
large proportion of the population. The group of countries with the next 
most regressive financing systems are the countries operating the so-called 
social insurance model, notab!y France, Spain and the Netherlands. That 
these countries’ systems are less regressive than those of Switzerland and the 
U.S. is partly because social insurance is less regressive than private 
“The top three deciles of equivalent gross income in Ireland accounted for 66% of 
expenditures on private insurance premiums. 
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insurance, partly because there is less reliance on out-of-pocket payments in 
the second group of countries, and partly because persons in the lower 
income groups in the latter countries tend to be less likely to be called on to 
make out-of-pocket payments. The final group of countries, which include 
Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and the U.K., rely mainly on tax-finance and 
have the least regressive financing systems. Indeed, in the U.K., Ireland and 
Portugal health care finance is, as has been noted, marginally progressive. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Health care is typically financed from a mixture of four sources: taxes, 
social insurance contributions, private insurance premiums, and out-of- 
pocket payments. The precise mix varies from one country to the next. 
Amongst the countries that finance the bulk of their expenditures publicly, a 
distinction is made between tax-financed systems (Denmark, Ireland, Portu- 
gal and the U.K.) and social insurance systems (France, the Netherlands and 
Spain). Few countries finance the bulk of their expenditures privately: only in 
Switzerland and the U.S. do private insurance premiums and out-of-pocket 
payments combined exceed 50%. 
On standard incidence assumptions, taxes are typically a progressive 
means of raising revenue. The overall degree of progressivity of taxation 
depends on the progressivity of each tax and the precise mix used. Typically 
direct taxes are progressive and indirect taxes regressive. Thus in principle, if 
direct taxes are insufficiently progressive, and/or there is a sufficiently strong 
emphasis on indirect taxes in the financing of health care, the tax burden 
overall could be regressive. In none of the countries in the present study, 
however, does this appear to be the case. 
Social insurance, by contrast, tends to be a regressive method of raising 
revenue. This is typically because contributions are subject to a ceiling, 
though in some countries the marginal contribution rates themselves decline 
as earnings rise. There are, however, progressive elements to social insurance: 
for example, certain groups, such as pensioners, are typically exempt from 
contributions. Overall, however, social insurance tends to be regressive. 
The same is true of private insurance in countries such as Switzerland and 
the U.S., where the majority of the population has no public insurance cover. 
Indeed private insurance is a more regressive method of raising revenue than 
is social insurance, the reason being that whereas the latter is assessed on the 
basis of earnings, at least up to a point, the former is not. To the extent that 
private insurance premiums are adjusted for risk, premiums may actually be 
negutively related to income, since the worse-off tend to be in relatively poor 
health. Only in countries like the U.K., where private insurance buys 
supplementary cover, and in countries like Ireland and the Netherlands, 
where private insurance is taken out mainly by the better-off, who have 
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limited public cover, is private insurance progressive. This simply reflects the 
fact that private insurance in these countries is purchased only by the better- 
off. To the extent that further expansion of private insurance in these 
countries can only come about as a result of persons in the middle and lower 
income groups also taking out private insurance, such expansion would 
make private insurance less progressive. Indeed, at some point such expan- 
sion would render private insurance regressive, as it is already in Switzerland 
and the U.S. 
Out-of-pocket payments are also generally a regressive form of health care 
finance. Such payments tend to be substantially more regressive than social 
insurance, and in countries where private insurance is widespread, they tend 
to be even more regressive than private insurance premiums.i8 In tax- 
financed systems, out-of-pocket payments are typically the only regressive 
elements in the financing system, apart from indirect taxes. The regressive- 
ness of out-of-pocket payments stems, of course, in part from the higher rates 
of sickness and medical consumption of the worse-off. 
Given the above, it should come as no surprise that while tax-financed 
health care systems (such as those operating in Denmark, Ireland, Portugal 
and the U.K.) tend to be mildly progressive or proportional, social insurance 
systems (such as those operating in France, the Netherlands and Spain) and 
predominantly private systems (such as the American and Swiss systems) 
tend to be regressive, with the latter systems being particularly regressive. 
These results have clear implications for some of the broad-brush health 
care reforms proposed in the OECD countries. A switch from social 
insurance to tax-financing, as has occurred recently in Spain and was 
planned for Italy following the setting up of the Italian national health 
service in 1978, is likely to make health care finance more progressive and 
may even turn a regressive system into a progressive one. A greater emphasis 
on public financing in a predominantly private system, as is advocated by 
many American and Swiss commentators, would reduce the overall regressi- 
veness of the health care financing systems of these countries and might even 
result in progressive financing systems, depending on the precise model 
adopted. A greater emphasis on out-of-pocket payments, as has happened 
recently in France and several other OECD countries, is likely to make 
health care financing less progressive or more regressive. 
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